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CHAPTER I 
IN'rRODUC TION 
In 1954 Guatemala was the scene of a coup 
d'etat in which the .Al'benz government was overthrown 
by a military junta. President Jacob Arbenz was re-
placed by Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas, one of the 
leaders of the rebels. The revolution produced U1e 
usual recriminations. Many Latin Americans asserted 
that the United States bad engineered the coup to pro-
tect the investments of Yankee businessmen in Guatemala. 
The United States was charged with being overly solici-
tous about the position of the United Fruit Company.l 
on the other hand, the United States accused the Arbenz 
government of communist domination arx'i called the 
President a willing tool of the Soviet government. Thus 
the revolution or 1954 raises many interesting 
q,uest1ons. 2 
l 
"Guatemala," IJ.'ime, June 28, 1954, p. 39. 
2 Daniel James, Red Design tor the Americas (New 
York: John Day Company,~954), P• 66. 
l 
2 
Was President Arbena truly an idealist? Was 
he sincere in his agrarian reforms? Were social and 
economic justice for the people major objectives ot his 
program? Or was he indeed a tool of the communists? 
Was the United States merely an interested by-stander 
or did she actually promote the revolution in the 
interest of "dollar diplomacy" and a new extension of 
the Monroe Doctrine? Should the revolution be viewed 
as still another manifestation of the 1nsurrect1onary 
propensity as suggested by the Wall Street Journal?3 
Answers to these and other questions must come from an 
intensive investigation of the political and economic 
events of the 19501 s. 
Guatemaian history is tilled with domestic 
turmoil. Power is in the hands of a small but affluent 
minority. Poverty, illiteracy, and disease are wide-
spread among the population. The majority of the 
population are of Indian ancestry. 4 The Indian popula-
tion speaks one or more of the f1f teen dialects which 
makes communication difficult with the government, and. 
! The Wall Street Journal, June 2, 1959, p. 1. 
4 Estimates indicate that from f ifty-th~ee to 
seventy-five percent of the total population are at 
least part-Indian. 
3 
most important, their employers. In addition to 
illiteracy and disease, the Guatemalan Indians are, and 
have been tor centuries, afflicted with paganism and 
superstition. The lite expectancy ot the Indian laborer 
is thirty-six years. Consequently, the ranks ot labor 
are continuously expanded by the cheap and plentiful 
child labor torce.5 
r.rh.e missionaries have campaigned extensively, 
on behalf of Christianity, education, and better health, 
with varying degrees of succesa.6 The prevalent reli-
gion in Guatemala is Roman Catholicism. However, the 
more sophisticated urban population in the country do 
not take Catholicism seriously. Political leaders con-
tinually exploit the organization and wealth of the 
Church when it is to their advantage, and openly dese-
crate the Church when it is opposed to the governmental 
policies.7 
5 Austin F. Macdonald, Latin American Politics 
and Government (1954), P• 615. 
6The opinion ot this author, which is shared by 
many, is that the missionary contingent from north ot 
the Rio Grande, should first concentrate their capabil1· 
ties and funds, in restoring and improving the values, 
faith, and respect of the urban population who are only 
nominal Christiana. 
7nonald E. Worch&ster, The Growth and Culture 
of Latin .America (1956), P• 113. 
4 
The open desecration of the catholic Church in 
Guatemala was not one of the principal aims of the com-
munist tacticians because the Church was largely free 
from political activity.8 Even during the despotic rule 
of General Ubico it consciously refrained from attacking 
the government. The Church concerned itself with non-
political areas; helping to soften the impact of poverty 
and to alleviate the despair of the multitudes. Because 
of these activities the long-suffering peasantry were 
devoted to the Church. 
The communists carefully appraised the situation 
taking into account the attitudes of the people. Slowly 
they began to formulate plans to distribute their sub-
versive forces of propaganda. Their reluctance to 
harass the Church was wise. They could not influence 
the Church and to openly tight it would result in the 
antagonism of a formidable opponent. 
Although pure blooded Indians leave Mass at the 
catholic Cathedral to w:>rah1p the pagan gods of their 
Mayan ancestors, they respect the hierarchy of the 
Church. They are impressed by the Church rituals; the 
pomp and ceremony. They eagerly attend the celebrations 
and test1v1t1es, and often consult the local priest tor 
aid in a personal problem. Therefore, in this way the 




Mayan religion, finds himself falling into the routine 
of the Catholic Churah.. 9 It is not the peasantry, but 
the urban inhabitants who pay understanding homage 
through the Catholic Church. 
The Indian labor platoon was used for exploita• 
tion and continued deprivation on the aristocratic 
plantations. Downtrodden and disgruntled Indians have 
long been used as the foot soldiers by leaders or 
rebellions and counter-rebellions. The revolution or 
1954, for example, was fought by the ever-present 
Indian le.borer. The army, fearing for their own 
security, however, would not consent to arming Indiana, 
as they feared Indian retaliation against any regime 
throughout the country.10 
Certainly the need for political, economic and 
social reform in Guatemala has been great. It is not, 
therefore, surprising that recent governments have been 
exposed to revolutions led by leaders who champion the 
cause of' reform tor personal gain. 
9Ibid., P• 117. 
10David L. Graham, Nation, November 9, 1957, 
P• 314. 
CHAPTER II 
POLITICAL BACKGROUND OF GUATEMALA 
The history of Guatemala is similar to that ot 
the majority ot Latin-American countries. The road to 
independence was difficult and turbulent. Usually the 
presidents have been of the oaud1llo breed. The "man 
on horseback" has been the rule. Many of the dictators 
have had a long tenure in off ice by Latin-American 
standards and some have been benevolent but none have 
been addicted to political democracy. Thus the people 
of Guatemala have had 11 ttle experience w1 th 
self-government. 
The most influential or the recent despots were 
Manual Estrada Cabrera (1898-1920) and Jorge Ubico (1931-
1944). Estrada was elevated to the presidency in 1898. 
He reigned as ruling despot for twenty-two years. Like 
most dictators, he paid scant attention to human rights. 
although all or his constitutions in theory guaranteed 
civil rights.l In 1920• one of many revolution attempts 
was successful. The once powerful Estrada died poor and 
tor gotten in 1924. 
1 Macdonald• op. cit •• P• 118. 
6 
7 
The regime of General Jorge Ubico is still an 
influence on present-day politics. Many ot his former 
aids and discipline-enforcers are reportedly in posi-
tions of power in the present government.2 Ubico•s 
dictatorial methods of administration and suppression 
did contain some noteworthy achievements. To combat 
depression, Ubioo entered into reciprocal trade agree-
ments with the United States, allowing tree entry ot 
coffee to the United States during ~Vorld r;~ar II. Thia 
cooperation with the United states undoubtedly precipi• 
ta ted additional investment of .foreign capital and 
technology in Guatemala during the post-war years. 
Ubico also expropriated all German land holdings during 
World War II. 3 During his administration new roads 
were built, schoola were expanded, and general economic 
prosperity prevailed. These accomplishments help to 
promote the idea that Latin J\mer1can nations are not 
ready for complete deomcracy, but need governments that 
will pursue stringent economic and social reform programa. 
However, some Guatemalans lamented that the 
price of their economic prosperity was too high. They 
viewed with alarm the lack of personal freedom and the 
increased restrictions on their political and social 
2 James, op. cit., P• 63. 
3 ill.9.•, P• 65. 
8 
activities. Opposition to Ub1co became so great that he 
was forced to abdicate in May, 1944.4 
Ubioo's forced resignation resulted in political 
chaos for a time. He attempted to continue his control 
of the country through a puppet president, General Ponce. 
But Guatemalans soon forced the resignation of Ponce, 
and Ubico was forced to seek asylum in the British con-
sulate. Ironically, the end result of the overthrow of 
Ubico's regime was the election of an ineligible 
candidate as president. 5 Following a period of confusion 
in October, 1945, a committee of liberation announced a 
general election to replace the Ubico congress. J"uan 
Jose Arevalo, a forty-two year old school teacher, was 
the nominee of a composite of political parties • 
.cU"evalo had resided in Argentina for ten years and ac-
cording to Jua temalan law was technically ineligible 
for office. Nonetheless, Arevalo captured the imagina-
tion of the voting populace and he was consequently 
elected president by an overwhelming majority.6 He 
received ninety-two percent of the popular vote and 
assumed otfiee in March, 1946. Although Arevalo 
4J, D. Martz, Communist Infiltration in Guate-
~ (New York: Vantage Press, 1956), P• 103. ·' 
5 Macdonald, op. eit., P• 118. 
9 
received ninety-two percent of the vote, control ot the 
Army is tantamount to control of the government. 
llrevalo described himself as a "spiritual 
social1st,•7 committed to ideological socialism with no 
affinity for Marxism terminology. Most correspondents 
believed .Arevalo's sincerity in espousing a reform pro-
gram. Arevalo soon realized that his civilian status 
wcnld alienate the military. Purthermore his reform 
program endangered his position with the aristocratic 
landowners. His main strength was the active endorse-
ment of the intellectuals but they were small in number 
and unar ganized. 
The 11revalo government was influenced by 
finance minister Jorge Toriello, and the latter's power 
soon forced a test of strength. Arevalo gradually 
strengthened his alliances with the army and Toriello 
was forced to resign in March, 1946.8 
Arevalo revoked Ubico's ban on labor unions in 
1946. Many correspondents and close observers point to 
this event as the first good opportunity for the infil-
tration of communist and communist potential in the 
reorganization of Guatemalan unions. Management, as 
usual, was adamant to the reorganization of unions. The 
70Guatemala," Current History, XXIV (March, 1953), 
P• 143. 
8 Martz, op. cl~., P• 105. 
10 
majority or businessmen in Guatemala ignored the unions, 
and allowed. them to be control.led by those opposed to 
management.9 The unions which were embroiled in the re-
construction or by-laws, labor philosophy, and organiza-
tion had little recourse but to turn to the increasingly 
powerful communists and their readily available adm1n1s-
trative and monetary ass! stance. Mexican labor leader 
Vicente Lombardo Toledano was prominent in the erection 
and solidification of labor unions. Toledano denies 
communist affiliation but his ideas and tactics are 
1nd1 stinguishable from standard .Marxist procedures.10 
Arevalo worked strenuously on behalf ot 
economic reform, Which helped pacify dissident peasants. 
He effectively eradicated the remaining hostile elements 
by inflicting a strong censorship of the press and a 
methodical wave of assassinations of conservative. 
leaders. 
The first peaceful and constitutional trans-
mission of office in decades was accomplished in March, 
1951. Arevalo 1 s personal choice to succeed him was 
Colonel Jacob Arbenz Guzman. Arbens, a thirty-seven-
year old defense minister under Arevalo, was acclaimed 
president over one hundred aspirants for office. Other 
lOJames, op. cit., P• 65. 
11 
candidates were never given an adeqµate opportunity to 
present themselves to the voters, so Arbenz achieved an 
easy victory.11 
.Arbenz continued the reforms of Arevalo with 
great vigor. It is not surprising that his administra-
tion was also charged with being pro-communist. Close 
observers of Central America claimed that Guatemala was 
fast becoming a Russian satellite at the beginning ot 
the July, 1954, liberation. 'rhe communist propaganda 
machine was reportedly printing textbooks, pamphlets, 
posters, and magazines for distribution. These books, 
written in Spanish, ~ere reportea increasing in number 
during the last days of the Arbenz reign. In 1953 the 
cabinet and congress began to advocate leftist policies, 
although pro-American press and radio service were still 
in operation.12 One reporter contended that "the 
government wants outsiders to think it is just a silly 
harmless democratic little bunch of grain tarmers.•13 
Apparently few people read what those on the 
scene were writing about Guatemala. Arbenz•s red 
llT1me. XX.XVIII (March 261 1951). 
l 2see, tor example, Keith Monroe 0 Guatemala, 
What the Reda Lett Behind,• Harpers Magaz!ne, CLXXXI 
(July, 1955), P• 61. 
13~. 
12 
tendencies were not suspected even after his land reform 
program or 1952. Arbenz's land reform (or land grab. as 
American bns1nessmen preferred to call it) consisted 
mainly of nat1onal1z1.ng all of the uncultivated land. 
Exceptions were the small land-owning properties. The 
principal victim was the United Fruit Company which had 
234.000 acres confiscated. The Arbenz government 
offered payment for confiscated land at the assessed 
value which is far below its actual worth. Payment was 
to be in long-term bonds instead of cash. Although 
Arbenz' s land assessments were far below their real 
evaluation, some theorists proclaim that 1f these offers 
would have been accepted• Arbenz would not have relied 
on red-1nf ested unions for his support. 
Nationalist-minded Guatemalans pictured Arbenz 
as a do-gocder attempting to vanquish gringo businessmen. 
Many confidants of Arbenz believed his army background, 
political finesse, and alert intelligence would make him 
immune to communism.14 But Monroe claimed that gradual 
sweet talk and the persistent pressure by connnunist 
party members slowly converted Arbenz to a devout 
communist.15 
14Alfred. Barnaby, Thomas, Latin America, A 
History (New York: Macmillan Company). P• 50. 
l 5Monroe, "Guatemala, What the Reds Lett 
Behind.• op. cit •• PP• 64-65. 
13 
Arbenz was proud of the fact that his most 
f"ai thful subordinates did an eff 1c1ent job wi th~u t ac-
cepting graft. F'tlrthermore, he knew many of these men 
were members of the communist party. They were working 
for a specific cause. This growing contingent worked 
overtime and on Sundays w1 thou t monetary compensation. 
Arbenz round himself relying on these men to keep the 
machinery of government functioning. 16 
The General Confederation of Labor was, to many 
informed observers, a reu-dominated and very potent 
organization. The reds were successfully infiltrating 
the Labor Unions since 1946. Large percentages of 
Indif!UilS and farmers followed the General Confederation 
of Labor. Arbenz found himself conspiring with the reds 
to obtain a constitutional revision to secure his 
re-election.17 
Monroe emphatically claims that the reds 
persuaded Arbenz to oppress all opposition and become an 
enlightened dictator of the poor. In 1953 and 1954, 
Arbenz replaced Supreme Court Judges with his own hench-
men, and ruthlessly repelled student demonstrations with 
gunfire. These events certainly antagonized elements or 
the population. 
16 
17Robert M. Schneider, Communism 1n Guatemala, 
1944-1954, PP• 82-83. 
14 
David L. Graham, the Latin .American correspon-
dent or the .!i!.tfon, does not agree with Monroe's inter-
pretation of events. He contends that calling the .Arbenz 
regime communist was pure McCarthyism. Graham cites 
Arbenz liberal movements such as the initiation of 
agrarian reform, encouragement of labor unions, and edu-
cation of the illiterate as examples of real achievement. 
'There was considerable evidence of improvement of public 
works, expanded credit, better port facilities, and 
general economic improvement. 18 
Guillermo Toriello, Foreign Minister in the 
Arbenz cabinet, admitted that Arbenz 1 s government was 
not Utopia. However, he claimed that it was more repre-
sentative of the people than past administrations. 
Living standards were improved, and illiteracy was on 
the decrease. Toriello al so emphasized that business 
and privileged interests were being curbed and that only 
four communists were among the f1fty-s1x members of 
congress. Obviously speaking with a biased point of 
view, Toriello ma1nta1ned \bat Arbenz was supported by 
18nav1d L. Graham, »castillo's Guatemala,R 
Na ti on, P• 441. 
15 
a strong and popular party, which had the encouragement 
among others, of a minute communist party.19 The state-
ments or Graham and Toriello minimize the key 
characteristic of communist infiltration in Guatemala 
and other countries. 
Robert M. Schneider, in his book Guatemala, 
contends that some communists did maintain influential 
positions in certain strategic agencies which adminis-
tered vital governmental programs, and far more 
important they were firmly entrenched 1n sensitive 
positions that formulated public opinion. 20 
l9schne1der, op. cit., P• 83. 
The small nuDiber of communists elected to 
congress is a deceiving argument, as it has been proven 
1n many countries that communist agents tend to concen-
trate their attention on appointive offices and policy-
formula ting positions. 
CHAPTER III 
THE UNITED FRUIT COMPANY 
The greatest enigma in Guatemala was, and still 
is, the United Fruit Company. The United Fruit Company 
is at the center of charges and counter-charges or 
.American intervention in the internal affairs of another 
country. United Fruit has long been a subject of debate 
among writers and students of the Carribbean, No other 
American corporation, w1 th the possible exception of 
Standard 011, has been the subject of debate or more 
criticized than the United Fruit Company. 
During the greater part of its seventy-year 
existe~e, the United Fruit Company has been attacked as 
a state within a state. It is the biggest economic 
enterprise in Central America and of ten its budget ex-
ceeds that of the Central American countries in which it 
operated. Because of its size, it has become one of the 
most important economic factors and one of the most 
skillful political manipulators in Guatemala. 
In the ten-year period between 1944 and 1954 
the United Fruit Company was the personification ot 
"Yankee imperialism." Communist leaders still maintain 
that United Fruit was the underlying reason tor h!ner1can 
16 
17 
intervention in Guatemala in 1954. This author has 
round little convincing evidence of this charge, but 
feels sate in stating that the United Fruit company was 
well informed regarding the political unrest during the 
months preceding tbe celebrated revolution in June, 
1954. On the other hand, United .Fruit was the center 
of the agrarian retorm movements by the Arbenz govern-
ment. The expropriation of United Fruit holdings 
brought immediate diplomatic retaliation. A short 
summary ot the holdings and policies or United Fruit 
helps clarify the claims end counter claims of the 
Guatemalan and United States business interests. 
The United Fruit Company is a huge economic 
empire. It possesses immense tracts of land in ten 
Latin-American countries as well as investments in 
Europe and .d.frica. Despite the fact that United Fruit 
is generally known as a banana power, only 142,182 
acres are planted in bananas, while 1831 099 acres are in 
sugar, cacao, oil palm• and other orops.1 The company 
maintains 77,000 head of livestock. It owns and oper-
ates 1,700 miles of railways representing a fifty-five 
million dollar investment. It owns sixty-five vessels, 
forty-nine of which are refrigerated tor carrying fruit. 
Accompanying this massive fleet are whartage facilities 
which give United Fruit !!!_facto control over many major 
lJ. D. Martz, op. cit., P• 124. 
18 
ports, including Porto Barrios in Guatemala. 2 The 
company also owns and operates the first and biggest 
radio communication system in central America. It main-
tains newspapers, schools, commissaries, hospitals, 
recreation centers, housing projects, agricultural ex-
perimental stations, and medical research laboratories. 
Its employees need not go outside the company to 
satisfy their basic needs. 3 In a very real sense, it is 
a state within a state. 
United Fruit and other international 
entrepreneurs have incurred the hostility and distrust 
of a vast majority of non-communists as well as commun-
istic peoples. Propagandists use the word "exploitation• 
or charge tax fraud to emotionalize their claims. 
For example, in 1953 the United ~uit Company 
reaped banana crop valued at mare than il0,000,000 but 
paid the government of Guatemala in duties and taxes 
only tl,418,000. .Arevalo can hardly be criticized tor 
demanding a new tax arrangement that would give his 
regime more capital. But United lf'ruit refused to re-
negotiate old contracts regarding the amount of taxes 




to be paid. 4 This was a serious error because when 
Arbenz came to power it was too late. It is interesting 
to note that the communists preferred to let the old 
contracts prevail as a target for propaganda purposes. 
A second and more important is sue in Guatemala 
was the unenlightened labor policies of United Fruit. 
The company resisted labor organizations before the reds 
assumed control over the Guatemalan labor situation. It 
became even mare adamant when the communist-controlled 
unions attempted to negotiate new and admittedly extreme 
contracts. The result was years of labor strife charac-
terized by crippling strikes, and retaliatory lockouts 
which the communists always managed to exploit. 5 
'I'o some Guatemalans the most grievous of the 
allegations against United Fruit was its relationship 
with International Railways of Central America. Through 
a series at negotiations, compromises, and manipulations 
of stock, United ~Tu1t Company owns forty-three percent 
of the only national railway, and supplies its own loco-
motives and refrigerated cars. United Fruit saved 
millions of dollars by subsidizing and purchasing control 
4oav1d L. Graham, "Liberated Guatemala,n Nation, 




ot the railways·. 6 However, independent as well as 
Guatemalan shippers resented the fact that they were 
compelled to pay higher rates to ship their products 
than the economic baron from the North. 
More irritating to the average Guatemalan, who 
needed no communist ao nationalist to spur him on, was 
the fact that foreigners controlled their only rail 
line and only major sea port. 7 
Perhaps the United Fruit Company should not be 
pictured as completely unsympathetic to the needs or 
Guatemala. For, in actuality, tremendous advantages 
result from American enterpriae in the country through 
the building ot hospitals, railroads, and other projects 
that created many new forms of employment. The Great 
entrepreneurs are eager to discuss the benefits that 
accrue to the backward country when defending their 
foreign economic policy. Hut what are the motives tor 
this benevolence? Are they sincere or is it simply 
advantageous for the successful operation ot the 
company? 
61•Guatemala aack to '54," New Republic, June 22, 
1959, P• 4. 
711Guatemalan Episode," Fo1 .. e1~ A.f:f'a1rs1 1956, pp. 469-472. This animosity woua preva! 
United states if th~ entire Atlantic seaboard or 





These sources of irritation show that there was 
more than one reason tor the unrest in the diploma tic 
relations between the United States and Guatemala. 
First, the increasing communist insurgency was not the 
only cause for State Department consternation. Second, 
it is obvious that the United States was guilty or 
surreptitiously manipulating political movements to pro-
tect the interests o.f' her businessmen. The most obvious 
political intrigue centered around the generous corpor-
ate tax laws that our corporations in Latin !mierica have 
enjoyed. A major reason for the subtle benevolence ac-
corded the Castillo rebels by United Fruit and other 
American concerns, was the rebel chieftain's promised 
tax relief for the "oppressed" business interests. 8 
The .failure· of .American businessmen to train 
Guatemalan executives was a great social and political 
error. This resulted in lasting resentment against the 
American companies and made it necessary to use American 
personnel in 1954. Who among Guatemalan nationalists 
was capable of operating efficiently the great coffee 
and banana plantations? 
8Davici L. Graham, "Detour to Guatemala," 
Nation, P• 325. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1954 
The A:rbenz regime was finally ousted 1n June, 
1954, by a new revolutionary group headed by Colonel 
Carlos Castillo Armas ltlo was later installed as presi-
dent of Guatemala. There can be no doubt that Castillo 
was anti-connnun1st. He began his rule in an energetic 
fashion. First, be jailed all suspected communists and 
restored political order. Although he gave limited 
approval to some of the agrarian reforms of .Arbenz, the 
reform movement was largely hal tea. Guatemala had a new 
master. Castillo ruled without regard for democratic 
action and was aba.it as despotic as any of his 
predecessors. 
The new president possessed an interesting 
background. some elements of his career are typical of 
the Guatemalan emotional pattern, others appear to have 
been shaped by the United States. Born into a poverty-
stricken family, he was grad.uat ed .from a military 
academy, and received staff officer training at Fort 
Leavenworth in the United States. During his training 
in the United· States, he was noted for his fervent 
hatred of communism. 'l'his fact obviously pleased many 
22 
23 
American diplomats and businessmen. He returned home 
and immediately plunged into politics. In 1950, he was 
almost executed for plotting a conspiracy against the 
govemmen t. He made a daring escape from prison through 
a thirty-eight-foot tunnel.1 
The open approval which Castillo received from 
the United States during and after his coup d'!!!,! re-
quires an explanation. Many articles have been written 
about Castillo, but all lack objectivit7. Harpers 
Magazine contends that he was coerced by existing condi-
tions into becoming a martial-law president. Many Latin-
.American presidents have instigated thirty-day or longer 
martial laws, when seeds ot conspiracy were present. 2 
Guatemala bordered on political chaos in June, 
1954. The government was bankrupt, unemployment was 
high, tho tourist trade greatly diminished. When 
Castillo commenced to seek out and exile known commu-
nists, his most efficient administrative help was 
eliminated. His credit vanished, Americans and wealthy 
Guatemalans began to reinvest their profits in other 
countries. v¥0l'k projects were halted. 3 Castillo had to 
~1m~. August a, 1956, p. 2a. 
2Monroe, •What the Reda Lett Behind,• Harpers 
Magazine, July, 1955, p. 63. 
3current History, XXIV (March 24, 1953), p. 145. 
24 
make some changes in policy. The expropriated landa ot 
the United Fruit Company were returned. New petroleum 
laws were instituted and the government invited twenty-
eight foreign oil companies to begin operations in 
Guatemala. Laws were repealed affecting remittances and 
taxation of earnings from foreign capital.. 4 An invest-
menti-guarsn tee-agreement was signed w1 th the United 
States. Our ambassador Furifoy was mentioned as an 
influential mediator for United States and Guatemalan 
officials. An eighty-million-dollar loan culminated 
these transactions which were highly favorable to the 
United States. 5 
Castillo's new constitution was much like those 
of his i;redeoessors. Like most Latin-American constitu• 
tiona, this one exonerated those in the successtul 
revolution and denounced the losers. The president is 
elected under the new constitution, tor a term ot six 
years and is ineligible for re-election tor twelve years. 
The legislature is unicameral end is popularly ele.cted 
every tour years. A cabinet or ministers assists the 
president. The supreme court and appellate court are 
appointed and removed by congress. The president ap-
points a governor for each department, and municipal 
4 Schneider, op. cit., P• 87. 
5L1te, August 12, 1957, P• 41. 
25 
mayors am councils are elected by popular ballot. 
Suffrage is granted to both sexes over eighteen, with a 
6 literacy requirement for women. 
Article seventy-seven of Castillo's constitution 
guaranteed civil rights "except in the case of activities 
against the aecuri ty o:f' the state, perpetuation o.f the 
peace, public calam1 ty or invasion." Under troubled con-
d1 tions a special "law ot public order" can be invoked 
to replace the c<Xlst1tut1on during the emergency. 7 In 
essence this law contends that various degrees of emer• 
gency allowing sich things as the firing of troops on 
crowds, can be evoked by executive decree except foreign 
war, which requires congressional vote.8 
castillo's three-year reign received a favorable 
press in the United State,, chiefly because of his anti-
communism. One of his first acts as president was to 
dissolve the labor unions. Ile later permitted unions to 
organize, but not until their leadership was cleared by 
the a ll•Paf er:tul Committee for Na ti onal De.f'ense of any 
suspicion of communism. This movement undoubtedly 
pleased many American entrepreneurs. 
6rvtaodonald, op. cit., P• 617. 
7Monroe, •auatemala, What the Reds Lett Behind,• 




Castillo's constitution contained a powerfully 
worded provision which prescribed a three-year penalty 
for anyone taking part in an illegal strike. This pro-
vision also empowered the Committee tor National Defense 
to compel a man to stay in jail six months without trial 
9 for mere suspicion of' being or aiding a communist. The 
last provision is a powerful weapon in the hands of an 
unscrupulous man and amounts to the same as a suspension 
of the writ of habeua corpus in the United States. 
Castillo inserted some notable changes favor-
able to American diplomats. Churches and religious 
orders denied legal status since 1870, regained their 
full lawful rights including the right to property. Com-
munists and other totalitarian parties were banned. Also 
10 
banned was communist activity by individuals or groups. 
The exile of citizens, a f~vorite Latin-American weapon, 
was forbidden, although President Castillo ignored the 
ban in order to keep out henchmen of the former adm1n1s-
trat1on and jailed dozens of ~benz followers. Four were 
11 
exiled to El Salvador, law notwithstanding. 
Qastillo the •Liberator of Guatemala• was 
9Ib1d., P• 64. 
l0nav1d L. Graham, "Detour to Guatemala,• Nation, 
P• 326. 
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assassinated in July, 1957 while walking with h1s wite 
to a palace dinner. He was only thirty-seven at this 
time. Official sources claimed a psychotic member of 
12 the presidential guard was the assassin. 
Why was Castillo killed? Assessment of the 
Castillo regime will be difficult. There were many 
gains made. The communist party was suppressed, United 
Fruit Company regained their land holdings, the tourist 
trade increased and the United States had invested an 
eighty-million-dollar loan. American oil companies were 
investing millions in experimentation and exploration. 
Yet, there were many Guatemalans who were not 
happy. There. were the disgruntled peasants who had been 
deceived and lost their opportunity to own their own 
land. Labor leaders were dissatisfied with Guatemalan 
courts which shamelessly espoused the side of employers 
and ignored the persecutions of rural workers by land-
13 
owners. 
There was considerable unrest over tood speou-
lation. F1'1ends ot Castillo were reputedly cornering 
the corn and bean market. Castillo retaliated against 
criticism with police-state methods. Columnist Jose 
Alfredo Palmieri stated that the best p~ofi ts are always 
12~, August 12, 1957, P• 42. 
l3James, op. cit., P• 64. 
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made on lm.nger, and food speculation hands the com-
14 
munists ready-made arguments, Castillo like previous 
leaders, suppressed some elements in order to gain the 
power and confidence of other parts of the population, 
Finally, Castillo was criticized because of 
his close association with the United States. College 
students in Guatemala do not care tor sports but they 
thrive on continual harassment of unpopular governments. 
The annual Easter Rag is a merry-making holiday of college 
students with political implications. Shortly before the 
assassination of Castillo, the students depicted the 
. sentiments of many Guatemalans with a skit commencing 
with a ah art prayer. The title was "our Father Who Art 
15 in Washington." 
Castillo's assassination created another crisis. 
The September, 1957 election was declared invalid by 
political pressure groups. A three-man junta announced 
a new election in November, 1957. The aged conservative 
Ydegoras has emerged as the new president of Guatemala. 
The Castillo constitution is still in effect, the 
governmental structure is unchanged, but leftist resur-
16 gence is reportedly gaining strength. 
l4•auatemala, Back to •54,• New Republic, 
September 18, 195'7, P• 9. 
15nav1d L. Graham, ncastillo's Guatemala,• 
Nation, P• 443. 
16schne1der, op. cit., P• 87. 
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The Ydegoras government is filled with hench-
men of the Ubico tyranny. Men like 4'revado, •roriello, 
and Arbenz are reportedly back in Guatemala and gain-
ing influence. 1be continuously swinging pendulum or 
Guatemala government and polities is on a precarious 
17 
ridge of reform. Past history and pattern of events 
suggest that the pendulum. will swing back to revolution 
and produce a new "lioerator" for Guatemala. 
17"Guatemala Back to 154,• ~ew Republic, P• 4. 
CHAP'.rER V 
THE UNITED STATES AND THE REVO LU'l'ION 
The United States has always taken a vital 
interest in the affairs of Latin-American nations, par-
ticularly in Central America and the island republics 
of the Caribbean. As early as 1823, President Monroe 
stated the proposition 1n the Monroe Doctrine that the 
United States would consider it an unfriendly act for 
any European nation to try to take control of any in-
dependent nation in the ~estern Hemisphere.l Although 
modi tied and sub je o ted to various int erpreta ti ons the 
doctrine has been perhaps the most consistent element 
of the fOt"eign policy of the United Sta tea. 
Shortly after 1900 fresident Theodore Rooaevel t 
added substantially to the doctrine by declaring that 
while the United States could not let &lropean nations 
interfere in Latin-America, neither could the United 
States allow these countries to conduct themselves in 
such a way as to invite intervention. The "Roosevelt 
Corollary," like the original Monroe Doctrine, was a 




During William Howard Taft's administration, 
United States foreign policy was operated on the basis 
of "Dollar Diplomacy". Investment of Amari can eapi tal 
in Central America was openly encouraged and the ad .. 
ministration promised protection. The United States 
aspired to gain prestige in these areas through fi-
nancial interests. I.ill ter ad.min1stra tions in Washington 
attempted to reverse this investment-directed policy of 
diplomacy but founa it difficult to ignore the demands 
for protection made by American businessmen. 
A :reversal \vas achieved, however, in the "Good 
Neighbor Folicy" developed during the 193()' s. This 
policy operated on the basis of juridical equality of 
all nations in the ~ies tern hemisphere. Relations between 
the United Sta tea and her ne1 ghbors to the south imme-
diately began to improve. But w1 th the Second World War 
the United States was forced to turn its attention to 
Bu.rope. Thu.s the Good Neighbor Policy became a casualty 
of war. Whether or not the war killed the policy is not 
clear, although the Guatemalan Revolution of 1954 seemed 
to rein.force the opinion of a great many Lat1n-.~ericans 
that the Good Neighbor Policy was dead. 
Many influential Latin-Americans have grave 
doubts about the motives behind the Monroe Doctrine. 
32 
It is linked in their minds with the spectre of inter-
vention and foreign interference by the United States. 
On the other hanl, individual republics have been quick 
to appeal for United States aid when in trouble --
Central America in 1834, Columbia and Ecuador in 1848, 
Mexico in the l860 1 s, and other situations too numerous 
2 
and con.flioting to men ti on. 
The present-day Latins are skeptical and jealous 
of their powerful and r1 ch northern neighbor. :Many 
Latina still live, work and completely rely on Uni·ted 
States business firms for their livelihood. Their 
appreciation is submerged because most Latins (1nclud1~ 
Guatemalans) consider North Americana as exploiters 
fearfully impetuous w1 th their new post-war economic 
power, and a sometimes fanatical zeal to stamp out com-
3 
mun1sm. They question some of our motives for an 
interest in their countries. '.rhey ask, ere they com-
pletely benevolent or exploitive in nature? 
This question of United States military inter-
vention in the domestic affairs of Latin .America is a 
constant source of friction. The stigmatism of dollar 
2 ~·• P• 47. 
3Frank Tannenbaum, "The Justice of Democracy 
in Latin America," Foreign Affairs, XXXIII (April, 1955), 
429-444. 
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diplomacy is st ill prevalent in Lat.in thinking. 
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was aware of this 
feeling of mistrust during the l950 1s. Yet he possessed 
sufficient leverage to resolve the problem. His decree 
would determine which nation would receive economic and 
te~~nioal assistance from the United States.4 Therefore, 
he proceeded to Caracas in January, 1954, with one main 
idea: to procure a document condemning communist inter-
vention in Latin America. He was quite willing to 
threaten withdrawal of American aid to gain his 
.objective. 
The Dulles policy of massive retaliation was 
applied to the Monroe Doctrine and related legal theorem& 
at the meeting of the. Tenth Inter-American .Conference at 
Caracas, Venezuela, in March, 1954. The United States 
had previously stated 1n d1plomat1c channels that the 
conference must reassert the compact that communism 
would be unwelcome in the western hemisphere. 5 
Dulles engineered his "legal protectorate" by 
a multitude of perSJ.asive methods. The most et.fective 
4"Rev1ew of the Week," New York Times, March 14, 
1954. 
5New York r.rimea, 1iarch 3, 1954. 
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method was the threat of economic reprisals via United 
6 States foreign aid. 
The following quotation was the most convincing 
defense that Dulles could muster to charges of 
intervention. 
• • • the Conference • • • declares that the 
domination or control of the political insti-
tutions of any .American state by the Interna-
tional hemisphere the political system of an 
extra-continental power, would cons.titute a 
sovereignty and political independence of the 
American states, -- and would call for a meet-
ing of consultation to consider the adoption 
of appropriate act;on in accordance w1 th 
existing treaties. 
Secretary of State Dulles was satisfied that 
the principal significance of the Caracas meeting was 
that the United States succeeded in .forcing the Organi-
zation of American States to agree to a firmer 
6ib1d., March 6, 1954. It is 10rthwhile to note 
that tbose"Iiitions who supported Dulles were not the 
democratic nations but the authoritarians -- Venezuela, 
the- Dominican Republic, Cuba, and Peru. 
Sidney Guson described the f eel1ngs of the 
Lat1n-.-'llner1cans succinctly: "Senor Toriello (Guatemalan 
F'oreign ?ii.inister) had said many nasty things about the 
United Jtates that virtually cost them nothing. :Sut not 
many were willing to vote against the United States when 
tbey might have to set up later in the conference and ask 
far economic aid ••• " 
7un1ted States Department of State Tenth Inter-
.americc.n Conference ( -.. ashington, D.c., 1955~, PP• 15G-rn. 
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anti-international communist statement than before. 
Guatemala was not specified in the statement; however, 
all the delegates were aware of the implied reasoning 
behind the statement. 
The "existing treaty" that Dulles referred to 
was the "Rio Fact" of 1947. The Rio Treaty, in part, 
authorized a meeting of foreign ministers of the hem1-
sphere to find solutions and take measures necessary 
. 8 
tor the o:>mmon defense of all hemispheric nations. 
After the Caracas meeting the United States 
was in a position, according to our state aepartment 
legal analysts, to openly intervene and exploit any of' 
the abortive international communist attempts to seek 
control of a nation in the western hemisphere • 
.Philip B. Taylor, University of Michigan po-
litical scientist, questioned the 3ubtlety in which 
Mr. Dulles conciucted himself after the conference ao-
cepted his International Communist suppression pact. 
Taylor stated that Secretary Dulles attendea one meeting 
of an economic subcommittee and indicated the United 
States was not prepared to discuss Latin-American in-
ternal problems. His aeparture the next day, March 14, 
1954, a full two weeks before official aujournment, was 
8 J. 1'elders, United Nations Textbook (Leyaen, 
Netherlands, 1954), p. 365. 
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considered by many Latin diplomats as insulting and an 
admission that the United States was mainly interested 
in the pol1 tical support of La tin-America and not sut-
9 
ficiently interested in their internal economic affairs. 
Thus Dulles was guilty of injuring his own 
scheme. Many Latina are well aware of the security 
threat posed by international communism. Nonetheless, 
one of the main reasons the Latins con vaned at Caracas 
was to discuss effective means of solving their mutual 
economic problems. When Dulles gained the desired ame.00.-
ment to the Monroe Doctrine to include international 
communism as a foreign invader of our hemisphere, he 
disemoarked for ~•ashington, leaving the Latins with th!t 
10 impression that their interaal affairs were irrelevant. 
Another result that worried our Latln-.Ameriean 
neighbors was the fear that the Caracas resolution would 
be used as a coercive weapon against Guatemala. Secretary 
Dulles gave repeated assurances to the delega tea thot the 
resolution was not aimed at any one country and that the 
United States was solely concerned with intervention of 
international communists in this hemisphere. 11 
9
.Philip B. 'faylor, "The Guatemalan Affair,"' 
American Political Science Review, L (September, 1956), 
790. 
10~· 
ll11Rev1ew of the Week, n N,ew York Times, March 
14, 1954. 
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In SUmmary, Secretary Dulles may have gained 
an immediate victory for the United States in its fight 
against international comnunism out he lost a great 
deal by alienating Latin-American delegates with his 
1ncUfferance to their economic problems. 
Events leading to the Civil '"Var in Guatemala 
were first .PUblicizeu with a state uepartment announce-
r~1i;;mt on i.1ay 17, 195•.1, concerning a shipment of arms 
. 12 
tha.t had arrived at Puerto i-Ja.rrios,. Guatemala. How-
ever, an interesting event took place the preceding 
autumn that deserves some a ttent1 on. 
On October 3, 1~53, John E. Peurit'oy was ap-
pointed United States Ambassador to Guatemala. 13 He 
12New .lork Times, }l~ay 18, 1954. 
13"u. s. Ne!.!..,_!nd w4orld Report, UI Time Mae;azi!!!_. 
Peurifoy was a career diplomat who at one time 
was an elevator operator in the Capitol Building. He 
was a cadet at West Point when he suddenly cp.it, claim-
ing illness of his father. In spite of his humble be-
ginnings, .Peurifoy was soon recognized. as an alert and 
aggressive young man. His ascendency 1n the state de-
par·tmen t rapid. hmrifoy was a tough and able man, an 
expert marksman, he was nearly always armed for his 
personal protection while at his post in Guetemala. He 
achieved notable success dealing with communist antag-
onism in Greece durinr1; the ·ci v11 strife at 1946-47 and 
was held in high :regard by high state department offi-
cials in both the Truman anu ~isenhower adm1n1stra t1ona. 
John l)eurifo:y was killeu in an au to acc1uent while on 
leave 1.n 1957. 
had alreadJ esta,Jlished a reputation as an accomplished 
anti-communist aiplomat by his activities in Greece, and 
1 t ma~1 be cons trued as anything but a coinciuence that 
this big.hly successful an ti-communist Uiplomat was tl'lins-
ferred to the sensi t1ve arefi. of Guatemala. C1:r•cumstan-
ti al evidence makes 1 t hi ';hly improbable that the 
reporliedly alert Peurifoy was impervious to the movements 
of i\rbenz opponents. Yet there is no evidence to 
1:mplic ate Peurifoy or any United States representative 
in the cons,p1racy14 that resulted in Castillo's invasion 
of Guatemala from Honuuras. Eowever, it is a known tact 
that Peurifoy, accompanied by an arme~ guard, was readily 
accessible for nen;otiation. 15 
14N1nth Interi!!!._Report of Hearings before tl1e 
Subco.mrnittee on Latiu Ame.i·ica of the select Committee on 
Commun1StAggress1on, House of. Representatives, Eip.htt-
th1rd Congress, Second Session, Washington, l954, P• 24 • 
.Flora Lewis, writing of Peurifoy, stated "it was 
perfectly clear that his instructions and his purpose had 
one simple theme: Get riu of the Heua." 
Peur1foy emphatically den1eri these charges, de-
claring: n ••• I would like to take this opportunity to 
explode a popular and flattering myth regarding the part 
I played in the revolution •••• ~iiy role vrns st1,ictly 
that of a diplomatic observer •••• The first and only 
octive role that I played.. • • • was to lend my good 
of'fices to assist in negotiating a 'l'ruce. • •• " 
l5New lork Times, July 3, 1954. 
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Arbenz sought asylum in the Mexican embassy on 
June 'Z'l th and the initial talks proveu to be inconclusive. 
Peurifoy was notified to be present at tu ture meetings. 
He claimed he was available for consultation with 
everyone16 and exonerated himself of any diplomatic 
pi• es sure tac ti cs. J\n agree.men t of total ca pi tula ti on 
was si r..;ned on July 2nd and reuri:f'oy retuz•ned to the 
United States embassy. 'rwo months after Castillo was 
installed in office, Peurifoy was tr.ansferred to another 
hostile country: Bol1 via. 
Controversy still rages about the chartered 
Swedish ship, ttle Alfhem, and the role it playeo in the 
coup. Journal is ts agree that the ship carr1eu 1, 900 
pounds of arms that; ox•iz,inated in Czechoslovakia and were 
destined far Bolivia. They differ about the type and 
effectiveness of the weapons. 17 
The United States delighted in using the 
shipment to arouse sympathy am widespread propaganda 
tor its ant1-Arbenz campaign. The Alfhem affair was also 
the basis for a United States request to search all 
mar chant ship a for arms to Guatemala. This request was 
rejected by all nations to which requests were made. 18 
16~· 
l7Ib1d •• July 9 1 1954. 
18~., June 19• 1954. 
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In the spring of 1954 there occurred a series 
of 1nc1dents which might be described as "coincidental." 
Sorne authorities claim the even ts were inspired. by the 
United States to disguise manipulation of the revolution. 
The United States si@:led mutual security treaties with 
Nicaragua and Honduras119 the former on April 23, and 
the latter on May ID• 
Subeeqiently, on May 24, the United States 
announced that they we1"e senuing war material to the two 
countries. On May 27 tlu'ee B·36 bombers paid a courtesy 
call on the Nicaraguan capital. l'hese events were 
preceded by the breaking of diplomatic relations by 
Nicaragua with Guatemala. 20 
To conclude that the United States played an 
important part in the Guatemalan debacle is feasible. 
but would be dif firult to document. There is no proof 
that any of the arms airlifteu from the United States to 
19 Ibid., June 7. 1954. 
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Honduras or Nicaragua, ultimately appeared with 
Castillo. 21 News reporters on the scene were of the 
consensus that Castillo's troops were armed with anti-
cpated muzzle-loacting rifles, jeeps, DC-3 and P-47 
aircraft, of ·v;orld. \.~ar II vintage, sn a brownish green 
22 
uniforms. 'ii or ld War I I supplies are in abundance 
throughout the world. However, it is not clear Ylhat 
type and caliber of war material the United States 
airlifted into Honduras and Nicaragua. 
The legal. implications of the Guatemalan affair 
would involve an understanding of international law 
beyond the scope of this pap er. 'I1he one technical point 
of law questioned by many writers and never sufficiently 
answered was, did any single nation or groups of nations 
have the right to ir.vestignte the Guatemalan affair? 
2loonald Grant, "Guatemala and United States 
Foreign Policy," Journal of International Affairs, IX, 
No. l (1955), P• 69. · , 
The 3aint Louis Post-Dispatch news analyst sum-
marized tnose wno were to blame for the Guatemalan 
in~1rrection by stating: • ••• This writer is not in a 
position to assign. precise roles for the events which 
culminated 1n the fall of the Arbenz eovernment, al though 
he was in tact an eyewitness to many of the decisive 
even ts. ~xileu '3'uatemalans, the government of Honduras 
and Nicaragua, the United States Departments of State and 
Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, the United 
States National Security Council and other agencies and 
1nd1 viduals were involved." 
22L1f e Magazine, July l2 and July 19, 1954. 
42 
The .Arbenz government proposed that the matter 
be taken up by the United Nations Seou.r1ty Council, 
'roe United States proposed that the. Guatemalan aftail' 
be the subject of the regional organization of the 
Organiv.ation of American States. 
The American delegate to the United Nations, 
Henry Cabot Lodge, held the dual position of representa-
tive of the United States ar1d Security Council pres1'.iEmt. 
Due to Guatemalan-Soviet tactics, Mr, .Lodge was placed 
\ 
in the d.itti cult posi t1on of having to detenu the po-
11 tical reputation of the Uni teu 3ta tes anJ. at the same 
time behave correctly as president of the United Ma ti ons 
23 Security Council. Mr, Lodge's delicate position does 
not excuse the conspicuous lack of diplomatic finesse 
displayed by the Uniteu States in ~le Guatemalan affair. 
In reply to Guatemala's request that the security council 
hear its grievances, Mr. Lodge contended that "· ••• it 
is increasingly plain that the situation in Guatemala is 
clearly a civil and not an international war. • • .~24 
This gratu1 tous remark enabled the Soviet propagandist 
to correctly inquire if the strife in Guatemala was not 
an international but a civil war, why was the united 
States concer~ed? In other words, the United States was 





inadvertently undermining 1ts own policy in Guatemala. 
The fear of an investigation ot the Guatemalan 
incident by the United Nations was finally squelched by 
an American-sponsored Brazilian-Columbia resolution that 
thwarted a Soviet-prompted Guatemalan reques·t for a 
United Nations investigation of the oontroversy. The 
Latin-ll.l'.l'.lerican s ta tea suosti tu ted an American Peace Com-
mi t tee jurisdiction which floundered in M'.exlco City in 
25 
a sea of inetfectiveneae. 
The failure of the Guatemalan delegate to secure 
the introduction of a resolution in the council calling 
for United Nahions rather than {;rganization of American 
States action may well have been a tactical device de-
signed to condemn the United. States by implication rather 
than by direct charge. 'J6 Certainly this was the result.'~ 
Can a case be made that the Guatemalan incident 
was precipitated because of the imminence ot the communist 
domination7 This, of course, would serve as a rationale 
for the behavior of the United States. The question is 
not whether the United States was furtively breeching 
international, legal, and mar al codes by intervening in 
the internal affairs of another country. In terms ot 
preserving 1 ts good reputation, the Uni teo. States was in 




a position of having to make a case out ot its actions. 
Furthern1ore, the Un1teti. States hai.i to make an appear-
Emce or treating the Organization of .american States 
and the United Nations with deference while using 
clandestine modes of persuasion and diplomacy to pro-
tect her actions. The Soviet Union is not a member of 
the o.A.s. and is not a frontline protagonist of the 
dispute, thus she could operate more eff ecti vel:r behind 
the wall of an interes tea party• 'l1his gave tha U. s. n.R. 
a distinct advantage in international diploma1Jy. 
The real issue 1s whether or not Secretary 
tulles and the State Department would have countenanced 
a full and impartial investigation oy an international 
body. An international faot-finJ group woulu have found 
ample proof of a communist government, notorious secret 
police and ruthless government. Certainly· it is also 
possible that the United States was .fearful of criticism 
about its financial ano. pol1t:i.cal interests in Guatemala. 
The enigma of Guatemala results from both the c()lll.munist 
and the corporate monopolies and aristocratic favoritism 
of the United States. Obviously the United States did 
not wish to have the 1 atter investigated by the world. 
Thus, the United Nations had to be ignored. It la 
interesting to note' that the United States condoned 
United Mations intervention in Korea and Triests -- why 
45 
not in Guatemala?27 
A synopsis of opinion of many foreign diplo-
mats relevant to the role of the United States in Guate-
mala was coherently if not eloquently expressed by 
Clement Atlee. titular leaCie.:r of the British labor party, 
•ie cannot pass this af f as just a Central 
American squabble, of which there are so 
many. There was a principle involved and 
that principle was the responsibility of 
the United Nations ••• , I am afraid 
that Guatemala has left a rather unpleasant 
taste in one's mouth. .aecause. to illus-
trate the theme I was putting it seems in 
some instances that the ao ceptance of the 
princlples of the United Nations is sub-
ordinated to a hatred of communism.28 
The sarcasm expressed by the British leader 
placed the United State~ in a precarious position. The 
charge of hlcGartbyism, viewod abroad as symptomatic of 
our naivete, was still discussed in diplomatic circles. 
The United States government wl th ample assis-
tance from the tabloid press exploitea the threats of 
comn1unist intervention in Guatemala to the utmost. The 
State Department had to do something. The United 
Nations. led by the skill.ful Hussian propaganO.ists, 
coula very easily have exposed .American intervention 
claims• so Scc1•e tary Dulles had no choice but to die tute 
our desires to the Caracas Assembly. The most ells-
couraging aspect of the Guatemalan incident was not the 
27 Arthur .Koch, New iork Times, June a1, 1955. 
28Taylor, op. cit. 
46 
bow or why, but the skill and tactics used 01 our 
government. 1rhe Gua temalau incidents plainl7 illus-
trate one grim fact: Unitecl States diplomacy is often-
times formulated in a vacuum. 
At a time when world peace hangs pz•ecarL:maly 
on the balance of United States diplomacy, it is ctitf1-
cult to be optimistic about the future. 
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